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1966—A Year of Challenge
for Monetary Management
lEtAPIDLY CHANGING economic conditions and
demands on financial markets required great flexibil-
ity in implementing monetary policy in 1966. This
need for flexibility led to several significant innova-
tions in the Federal Reserve’s conduct of open market
operations. It also led to some new methods of em-
ploying regulations and other actions to complement
open market operations.
The purpose of this article is to review important
monetary developments during the year and to iden-
tify, interpret, and assess significant changes in the
techniques of monetary management. To this end,
major monetary actions are discussed. The new tech-
niques are then treated in more detail. Most of these
techniques have been introduced since last spring. Such
limited experience in using them does not provide a
sufficient basis for evaluating them empirically. This
article, therefore, presents an assessment of their po-
tential for monetary management.
The recently released Fifty-Third Annual Report of
the Board of Governorsof the Federal Reserve System,
Covering Operations for the Year 1966 presents a
comprehensive review of economic developments dur-
ing the year and policy responsestothese developments.
The Report is the main source for this article, and it
contains the current economic directives and continu-
ing authority directives referred to later,
Review oi Federal Reserve
Monetary Actions
The Federal Reserve System’s most flexible tool for
influencing monetary and credit expansion or con-
traction is its ability to alter member bank reserves
1w purchasing or selling Government securities. These
actions, generally referred to as open market opera-
tions, are conducted by the Trading Desk of the Fed-
eral Reserve Bank of New York under the direction of
the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC).’
The FOMC issues a “current economic policy di-
rective” every three or four weeks. This directive serves
as the Committee’s formal statementof policy and pro-
vides operating instructions for the Trading Desk. In
1966, as in preceding years, the directive contained
three major points. The Committee:
(1) reviewed recent developments in eco-
nomic and financial conditions relevant to
the formulation of monetary policy,
(2) indicated broad goals for policy (such
as high employment, sustainable economic
growth, price stability, and a viable balance
of payments), and specified intermediate
objectives of monetary expansion to achieve
these goals,
(8) instructed the Trading Desk to attain
a prescribed set of money market conditions
that would presumably lead to the desired
movements in the intermediate objectives.
Exhibit I (pages 12 and 18) presents the current
economic policy directive in effect at the beginning of
1966 and the directives adopted at the Committee’s
fifteen meetings during last year. This exhibit sum-
marizes chronologically the Committee’s view of eco-
nomic and financial conditions in 1966 (Column 1), its
policy decisions in response to these conditions
(Column 2). and its operating instructions to the Trad-
ing Desk (Column 8).
1 The FOMC’s voting membership consists of the seven mem-
hers of the Board of Governors, the President of the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York, and the Presidents of four other
Reserve Banks (on a rotating basis). The seven Reserve Bank
Presidents who are not voting members in a given year do,




Exhibit II (page 20) summarizes other monetary
actions taken by the Federal Reserve System during
the year. These actions complemented the open
maiket operations described in Exhibit 1.
The impact of monetary actions in the short run is
frequently measured at two levels—changes in money
market conditions and movements in aggregate mon-
etary measures. These measures, however, also reflect
fiscal actions and other economic and financial de-
velopments, making it difficult to isolate the effect of
monetary actions alone.
The chief money market indicators considered in
this article are net reserve availability’ of member
banks (Chart 1), key money market interest rates
(Chart 2), rates on large certificates of deposit (Chart
8), and capital market rates (Chart 4). Aggregate
monetary measures considered are rates of expansion
in total memnber hToJk reserves ( Chart 5). money stock
(Chart 6), mnoney plus time deposits (Chart 7), and
commercial hank credit (Chart 8).
An examination of the policy record for 1966 indi-
cates that the year may’ appropriateh’ he divided into
three major periods. Theseperiods areJanuary through
April, May’ through October, and November and De-
cember. Monetary developLnents in each period are
reviewed in the next few pages.
January through April—
Desire for Restraint
From January through April, production was ap-
proaching capacity, spending was rising rapidly, and
prices \vere spiraling upward. The FOMC directives
called for increased monetary restraint. Money market
conditions became tighter, but most aggregate mon-
etary measures continued to expand at very rapid
rates.
As the year began, goals of policy were “to comple-
mnent other recent measures taken to resist the emer-
gence of inflationary pressures and to help restore
reasonable equilibrium in the country’s balance of pay-
ments.” In December 1965, the Federal Reserve
Board had raised the discount rate from 4 per cent to
4% per cent and the Regulation Q ceiling rate on time
deposits fromn 45 per cent to 5% per cent, Open
market operations \vere directed to moderate adjust-
mnents in the money market flowing from these actions.
The Committee continued to state the same broad
goals at its first meeting in 1966, hut deleted the phrase
“to complement other recent measures taken.” The
intermediate objective was changed from “accommo-
dating moderate growth” to moderating the growth”
in the reserve base, hank credit, and the money sup-
ply (Exhibit I, Column 2). This ‘was a slight move
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Key Money Market Rates
toward restraint. At the same time, existing money
market conditions were to be maintained, chiefly be-
cause of the Treasury financing schedule (Exhibit I,
Column 8). The broad goals and intermediate objec-
tives of policy were not changed at the next meeting,
but the operating instructions called for a move “to-
ward a gradual reduction in reserve availability,” still
“with appropriate regard for the current Treasury fi-
nancing.” This was a further modest move toward
restraint.
The Committee voted at its March 1 meeting to re-
sist “inflationary pressures” rather than “the emer-
gence” of such pressures. Instructions called for “some
further gradual reduction in reserve availability.” In
April, the Committee changed its intermediate ob-
jectives to “restricting the growth in the reserve base,
bank credit, and the money supply” rather than just
“moderating” such gro\vth.
Money market conditions tightened significantly
from January to April. Net reserve availability had
fallen to minus $250 million by the end of the period
(Chart 1). This contrasted with an almost balanced
net reserve position in December and January (when
the System was accommodating adjustments to the
discount rate increase) and was about $100 million
lower than average net reserve availability during the
latter months of 1965.
Most market interest rates rose from December to
April, indicating firmer market conditions (Chart 2).
The three-month Treasury bill rate and the effective
rate on Federal funds were slightly above the discount
rate. Offering rates on large certificates of deposit had
risen sharply, following the change in the Regulation
9 ceiling rate which had previously prevented further
increases (Chart 8). Capital market rates, which fre-
quently respond slowly to changing market conditions,
rose significantly (Chart 4).
While money market conditions became markedly
tighter, most aggregate monetary measures continued
to expand rapidly. Total member hank reserves and
money each increased at an annual rate of almost 7
per cent from December to April (Charts 5 and 6).
Money plus time deposits increased at an 8 per cent
rate, and bank credit increased at a 9 per cent rate
(Charts 7 and 8). Each of these rates ~vas high by
historical standards.
Aggregate monetary measures increased rapidly,
while money market conditions tightened significantly;
this fact suggests that rapidly rising economic’ activity
in early 1966 and its accompanying great demand for
credit from both the private and public sectors were
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the main cause of money market tightening. In re-
sponse to these economic forces, interest rates and
member hank borrowing from the Federal Reserverose
significantly. System actions, in retrospect, were not
sufficiently restrictive to stem the rapidly expanding
loan demand, and monetary aggregates rose sharply.
These actions, however, were taken at a time when
public opinion was concerned about rising interest
rates, and monetary policy was generally criticized
for being too restrictive—not too expansionary.
iflav through October—
Effective Restraint
Total demand for goods and services continued to
exceed available supply from May throm.mgh Oetoher.
Policy was more aggressivelydirected toward restrain-
ing total demand; it called for restricting growth in the
aggregate monetary’ measures. The System employed
several innovations to help implement its policy \\‘ithin
the context of a rapidly changing economnie situation.
During this period, measures of aggregate monetary’
variables moved more consistently with the desires of
the Committee than they had earlier in the year.
The directive adopted at the May 10 meeting altered
the hroad goals of policy only slightly, hut it included
a significant change in the operating instructions—the
introduction of the “proviso clause.” This clause mod-
ified the instruction for “attaining some further grad-
ual reduction in net reserve availability” by calling for
“a greater reduction if growth in required reserves
does not moderate substantially.” The proviso clause
represents one of the most important innovations of
the year and is discussed further in a later section of
this article. Each subsequent directive during the
year included a modifying clause of this type (itali-
cized clauses in Exhibit I, Column 8).
The directives adopted at the next several meetings
made no change in the broad goals of policy. The June
7 version called for maintaining recent money market
conditions unless required reserves expanded consider-
ahly more than expected. In such a ease, the manager
was directed to seek a further firming in market condi-
tions. The expected movements mentioned in the
proviso clause referred to projections made by the
Committee’s staff for presentation at each FOMC
meeting and updated between meetings.
On June 27, the Federal Reserve Board introduced
for the first time differential reserve requirements by
class of time deposits. The Board announced that re-
serve requirements on certificates and most other forms
of time deposits in excess of $5 million at each mem-
ber hank would be raised from 4 per cent to 5 per cent
in July (Exhibit II). Reserve requirements on savings
deposits and the first 85 million of time deposits were
left at 4 per cent. Introduction of the differential was

















FEDERAL OPEN MARKET COMMITTEE CURRENT ECONOMIC POLICY DIRECTIVES
Dote of
FOMC
Meeting Economic and Financial Conditions
The economic and financial deveiepnsunts reviewed
at this meeting indicate
(965 that domestic economic noponsion is gaining in strength in
Dec. (4 climate xl optimistic bcciness sentiment, with continuing actice
demands ton cnedit and snmn tonthen upword tneep in prices.
Although there appeors to hove been same resent inrpnunemnnt
in our intnrnutionol payments, the need ion iunthen pragmnss
(2)
Brood Goals ond Intermediate
Objectives of Monetary Policy
In this oitsconioer,’ It to the Federal Open
Market Committee’s policy
0
to complement Other recent meusores tokne to
resist the emergence of irgotiunory pressures
and to help restore reasonable equilihrioer in
the country’s balance of payments, while ac-
commodating moderate grmwth in the resence
base, horb credit, and the money supply.
Until the nest meeting at the Committee, and taking
into account the forthcoming Treosuny financing uctinity
and widely fluctuating seasonal pressures at this time
of year in addition to the rennet iesneose in Reserve
Rank discount totes. System open morknt operations shall
be directed to moderating any further adjostments in
manny and credit markets that may develop.
In light 5sf the Treasury financing schedule, System
open market operations cr61 the nest meatieg of the
Commitlee shall be conducted witha view to maintaining
obaut the current conditions in the money monbet.
(3)
Instructions to the Federal Reserve
Bank of New York
(Provko disuse ig Italics)
7966
Jon. (I
that domestic ecannmiu nuporsiun has strengthened further in
a slimate at optimistic business sentiment and with smme turth
upward creep in pnicos. Interest turns ore higher in most
markets in response to strung credit demurds and recentoticiol
note uctianc. Our international payments position impraned can.
siderably daring 1965 but tunther progress ic needed to attain
etentive bolonce.
to resist the emergence at inflationary pres’
ensures and to help restnre reasonable equilih-
rico in the country’s balance at payments, by
moderating the growth in the reserve hose,
hunk credit, and the money supply.
Feb. g that the domes tic economy is euponding vigorously, with prices
santinuing to nneep op and credit demands remaining strong.
Our international paymonts continue in deficit.
same as abuse Ta isttpiement this paliuy, c, 5, 5, 0 System open
marbet apweatiunu until the neat meeting at the
Committee
1
shell be snnduuted with a view* 2
5
witis appropriate regard for the current
Treasury financing,
toward e gradoul redcction in reserce unailability.
Mar, 1 same as abune to tesitt inflationary pressanes and to help
recta re neusonable equilibrium in lice cnuntry’t
balance ut paymeetu. by moderctieg the
growth in the eosnroe base, bank credit, and
the money cc pply.
to attaining some further gradual neduotian inneuerae
availability.
Man. 22 some us aboan same as above some as above
Apr. (2 thot the dames tin economy is expanding vigorously, with in-
dustriol prices tortinuing to creep up and credit demandare-eec
naming strong. Oun international paymerts continue in deficit,
to resist inflationary pressures ned to help
tone reasonable equilibrium in the country’s
balance of payments, bynestriuting the growth
in the reserve base, bank credit, ond the
money supply.
to ottaining coma further gradual reductian in reserve
050ilobility, while taking inta anoacet the iorthcomirg
Treasury fimonciog.
May 10 that the daweccic economy is ecpaeding vigoruosly, with in-
dustnial prices continuing ta rise ned credit demords nemuining
strong. Our international pnyments continue in deficit,
to resist inflationary pressures and to strength.
eneflorts ta restore ceusanable equilibrium
in tire country’s balance of poyments, by re-
ntr,ct;ng the growth so the resenne base, bank
cred;t, and the money supply.
5
whfle taking Into auaount the current Treasury
fsuanaing,
ix attaining some further gradual reduction in net resarce
availability, end a gnecsterredaction if grmsctb in re.
quired reservec does not moderate culccsantially.
June 7 that, while the mortgage manbet is tight. nutaeabiie soles hune
fallen oft, nod same cunnern exists about tha liquidity of non.
bark finonniol institutions, the domestic econnmy is continuing
to ecpond, with industrial prices rising farther and aredit
demands remaining strong. The tuneigo trade surplus has do’
dined und the international payments deficit hos increased,
same as ab000 in maintaining net reserne nnoilnbility ued related money
marbetconditiuar iv about their recent ranges;proa’ided,
however, 5/nat if required reserves expand consider.
ably more than ceaconally expected, operations shall
be conducted wish a view to attaining rome farther
gradual rrdoctioo in net reserve availability and
firming of momey market conditions.
June 2t
~
that, while there has been some reduction in automobile sales
ond residential construction, unor.oll dumestinecaruoic uctisity
isnort’;ouirg to expand, with industniul pniues rising iunther.
Mortgage murket conditions remain tight urd total ceedit de.
munds aentinun strong. The foreign trude sunplos has declined
urd the international payments deficit bus inureased.
name as obace to mrcintuinirg abnut the currert state ci eat ensenne
availability end related Canny murket uorndit’;ans. except
usnhangrs may be needed to muderote unusual liquidity
prnssnnes of finonniul institutions; proc’ided, Jr ‘er,
that if soch liquidity pressorec are not xc., ally
crrong and required reserc’e increases are“larger
than evpecced, operations ,nhall be conducted with
a situ’ to attaining some further gradual redocton
in net rerert’e ac’ailability and firming of ‘‘vney
marker conditions.
July26 that woen-ull domestic ec0000in octinity appeors ta be expanding
somewhat more napidly thor in the second qunetee despite
wecbnnss in reuidentiul construction, with industrial pniocs rising
further. Total credit demand c nnntinae strong and ganneicl
marbets, partinulorly for muntgagns, renoir fight. Despite nbc




whiie taking into account the terthnamlesg
Treasury financing,
‘‘ ‘ b lb t
s 11 but rd n It d mark
vided hotwee-er that if req~oiredreservec eu~L:d m t d
5
fth~tb ~ xJr ted~ d f ~ d ~a ~
door shall be conducted with a riesa’ tt attainia
come further gradual reduction in net reserve avai -
ability and firming of money market eonditionr.
Aug. 23 that acer-oil domestic economic activity is eapording morn
rcp;dly than in the second quarter, despite tonthen weakening
inrnsidential nanstructian. Recent wage and pninn developments
suggest that irfintionary pressures urn becoming mate intnnsc.
Crndit demand ccnntinue styant, financial morkets base tightened
further, and loternst nctes have risen substantially in on army,’
phere of great urnertairty. The bolannn nt payments uuntinuec
to reflect u aiacble underlying deficit.
coma as uhoan to supplying fha minimum nmocef ut neseroes consistent
with the mairrenunce at nndenlynunnymurbetcaodit’runs
and the maderutiun of unusual liquidity pressures;pro.
tided, howec’er, that if bank credit expands mere
rapidly than expected, operations shall be conducted
with a c.iew to seeking trill greater reliance nn
borruu’ed reterc’et.
Sept. 13 thnt muen-all domestic economic ovticity is ecpnnding vigorously.
despite the nubstontiol weakening in resideetiul carctnucrinn.
with irflar;anvny pressures persisting. Aggregate credit demands
continue strong urd shurt.tene financial munkets remain under
strain. The balance at paymenrc continues 0 reflnct a sizable
underlying dnfi;ir.
and in light of the new fisoal
program annaunxed bythe President,
tnrenist infictinnary prensunec and to strength’
eneflerts to restore neasanable equilibnicm
in the country’s balance of payments.
to mointuining firm but arderly nonditinns in the moncy
market; provided, however, that operarians shall be
modifiedin the light of unusual liquidity precsorer
or of any apparently significant des’iations of bank
credit franc current expectations.
Oct. 4 thur nven.all dvmnstiuecorceiu activity is expanding vigorously,
despite the substantiul weakening in residentini cvrstrccrior,
cvvertcinties in equity morknts, ord a sharp increauc in busirnsc
inventories. lrflctiunary pressures ore pensicting and oggrngctn
credit demands still remain strong. The bolonun ef payments
cvnrinuns to shuw a sicable liquidity deficit,
0 and in light of the new fiusal
program announced bythe Presidentc
to nnsist inflotioeary pressures and to continue
nflarts to restore reasonable equilibrium in the
caoetry’c buluece of payments.
vOfld taking auxeunf at farthuomieg Treasury
fleaaaings.
same as abuse
Nov. 1 that oaer’ull domestic ecuromic acticity is continuing tu espand
with sharply ricing defense nopenditunes but some eoideecns et
mndnnarirg tendenvies in sectors of the private economy. While
prices at seen materiuls hove denliend recently,upward demord
and cyst prescurec pnrs;st Ior many finished goods and seroicex.
flank credit cc pension hoc slunbened, Earlier utroinc in finan-
cml markers hove abared and certoin fiscal pulicy mencurec
haon recently been erocted by the Cangress. The bulunnu ot
payments remains nsnnivus problem.
to mcirrcie money and credit candit’,arc aun.
ducinc to the restremnt uf influtionary pressures
and progress toward eeusarohle nquilibnicm
in thn nnurtry’c bolanne mi payments,
°and faking axuount at the uerreai Treasury
finansing,
tu mnirtoieing gennnuily stendy conditions in the Carey
marker; pruc’ided, hou’ec’er, that operations shall hr
modified, inrofar as she Treacory financing permits,
do the light of bank credit developments during
thr ncoulh.
Non. 22 that aver’oll domestic economic unricity is continuing 0 eupond,
with sharply ricing detense oopnndtures but with ecidencec at
endenating tendoncins in vorinos snuturs nf the pnioute ccvnvmy.
While there has been svmn clawing in the pace of advunne at
brood price Censures, upward price pressures persist tar mony
finished gouds ond services, flunk credit and money hove shown
no ecponsivn in recent mneths. Long-term intencstnvtes hove
again risen cvmewhat after declining from their ale uueenn
pnvbs. The bolonom of poymnets remains a unnious pnablem.
to eairtoin muney und nredit condir;onu non-
duclue to ncsirflctinnocyennnamicecpnrsian
urd pragress toward censurable equilibriurn
in the country’s bvlonre of pvymentc.
to attaining somewhat easier conditions in the muney
murket, sinless bank credit appears to be resuming
arapc’d rate of expaucioa.
Dec. 13 that ocer-ull damestic ecunurnic aetiolty is nantmruing tu expand,
with rising defence eaperditunes but with udditinnvl noidennec
of muderoting tendenciec in the private economy, While there
has been soon sinwing in the pace of advance xl mast brnnd
price meusunes, upward price pressures persist for rnany finished
goods and seroices. flunk credit end nanny have chawn no
net mcpunsior in recent months. Although demands on bond
markets hose increased, upwurd pressunos en long-term interest
ruiex have mndnrntnd, The balance uf payments remains
serious problem.
to fasten money urd credit conditions cerdo-
clan to noninflationary eeanemiu eapunsion and
progress toward nnounnvble equilibrium in the
cuuntry’s bulance of payments.
cxcv as ubooe
nPlc.scsivcrnt unpcoprmntr tootnotccv,hrn inrlicvrcd in CsIr;mnc 2 sod 3.
Source; Filcy.Third Annual imps,; ci Ike k,a,d ci Gnr’crv,rmrf Ike 5sdc,al flc;erre Sys;sro, Csrnr,vs Opcram,.rn, ~sn Ibe Year 1966,seeking new time deposits. Banks competed for these
funds in order to meet rising loan demands without
further reducing their liquidity positions. Because of
increased competition from commercial banks, there
was some concern that savings and loan associations
might have large run-offs in their savings accounts after
their midsummer dividend dates. Such run-offs would
put further pressure on mortgage markets, which had
already become extremely tight. The increase in re-
serve requirements was designed to moderate com-
petition from commercial banks and thereby reduce
potential run-offs at savings and loan associations and
mntnal savings banks.
Both business and Government demands for credit
were increasing rapidly in early summer. Capital
markets had been deluged with new issues. These
circumstances, in addition to the pressure on savings
institutions, led to the inclusion in the June 28 direc-
tive of a provision for changes in net reserve availabil-
ity and market conditions “needed to moderate unusu-
al liquidity pressures at financialinstitutions,” Restraint
was to be exercised, hut orderly market conditions
were to be maintained.
The Federal Reserve Board announced on August 17
that reserve requirements for time deposits in excess
of $5 million at each member hank would be raised
further to a level of 6 per cent in September. This
increased the differential in requirements by type of
time deposit.
The August 23 directive reflected mounting strain
in the financial markets, citing the “maintenance of
orderly money market conditions and the moderation
of unusual liquidity pressures” as a constraint on op-
erations, Beginning with this directive, bank credit
replaced required reserves as the operating guide spec-
ified in the proviso clause. The reserve base, hank
credit, and the money’ supply were still cited as inter-
mediate objectives.
The Presidents of the Federal Reserve Banks sent
a letter to each member bank on September 1 regard-
ing the administration of the discount facilities. This
letter requested the banks to restrict expansion of
their business loans and to avoid “dumping” their
municipal security holdings (Exhibit II). It also of-
fered assistance in financing current security holdings
through use of the discom3t window. This was in-
tended to help curb inflationary pressures financed
by hank credit and to contribute to more orderly
market conditions. At the time, there was a great deal
of concern for the viability of the money’ and credit
markets. Problems of meeting huge current and pro-
spective credit demands in a climate ofSystem restrain-
ing actions were the chief cause of such concern.
Other branches of the Federal Government also took
action in earl>’ September that helped to stabilize the
economy and to moderate the upward trend in interest
rates. The tax credit for business investment was sns—
pended, and provisions for accelerated depreciation
were curtailed. Steps \vere taken to reduce the ilnpaet
of Federal agency financing on the credit markets,
The FOMC’s September 13 directive cited the new
fiscal program as a major factor influencing monetary
policy. The phrase “by restricting the growth in the
reserve base, bank credit, and the money supply” was
deleted from the statementof policy. Bank credit, the
operating guide in the proviso clause, thus became the
only aggregate monetary measure mentioned in the
directive. The operating instructions called for “main-
taining firm hut orderly conditions in the money mar-
ket; provided, however, that operations shall he modi-
fied in the light of unusual liquidity pressures or of
any apparently significant deviations of bank credit
from current expectations.” The same instructions
were repeated in the October 4 directive, At both of
these meetings, some of the Committee members fa-
vored relaxing slightly the degree of restraint. No
formal change in policy was made, hut significant
deviations in bank credit mentioned in the proviso
clause referred to slower growth than expected as well
as to more rapid gro\vth.
On September 26, following the passage of enabling
legislation, the Federal Reserve Board reduced the
ceiling rate on time deposits of less than $100,000 to
5 per cent (Exhibit II). Similar actions applying to
financial institutions under their respective jurisdic-
tions were taken by the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation and the Federal Home Loan Bank Board.
Money market conditions and changes in the rates
of monetary expansion both indicate that a consider-
able measure of restraint developed in the May to
October period. Net reserve~availability was generally
in the lower range established in late spring (Chart 1).
Most interest rates rose at a faster pace than in the
preceding period with man>’ reaching their highest
levels in forty’ years. Federal funds and Treasury hills
traded well above the discount rate during most of
the period (Chart 2). Large certificates of deposit
were offered at the 5% per cent ceiling rate, and the
secondary market rate on these deposits rose consider-
ably above the ceiling rate (Chart 3). Capital xnarket
rates also rose sharply as large issues competed for
limited funds (Chart 4).
During the period there were suhstantial changes
from the general practices of administering the dlis—
count rate and ceiling rates on time deposits. The
discount rate has usually heen changed whenevermar-
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Capital Market Rates
ket rates were considerably above or below it. By
mid-1966, the discount rate was out of contact with
most market rates. and this situation persisted for
several months. Furthermore, this period marked one
of the few times that the ceiling rate allowed on time
deposits was not raised when offering rates on these
deposits were at the ceiling for a prolonged time. It
was the first time that the rate ceiling led to a signif-
icant reduction in the volume of large negotiable
certificates of deposit outstanding since these clepos-
its became such an important source of funds for
commercial banks.
The rates of monetary expansion showed the effect
of restrictive monetary policy (Charts 5, 6, 7, 8).
From April to October, total reserves declined at a 2.3
per cent annual rate, and money’ declined at-a 1.5 per
cent rate. Money’ plus tune deposits increased at only’
a 2.6 per cent rate, and bank eredlit growth slowed td)
a 5.3 per cent rate, The sharp contraction in the vol-
ume of certificates of deposit outstanding was an i;n-
portant factor contributing to the slower rates of
expansion of total deposits and hank credit.
During this period, the Federal Reserve reduced
markedly’ the rate at which it was supplying funds to
the market. The System was not aeensumnodating the
great demand for funds to the extent it had earlier
in the y’ear. As a result, interest rates rose sharpl>’, and
rates of monetary expansion declined abruptly.
j\’overnber and Dcccrnber~
Desirefor Ease
Late in 1966, as the economic expansion appeared
to be slowing, the Federal Open Market Committee
stated a somewhat easier policy. Monetary restraint in
the previous period, as indicated by lack of growth
in hank reserves and money, slower growth in bank
credit, and markedly higher interest rates, had helped
curtail the excessive demand for goods and services.
Bank credit had not increased during October, in
contrast to earlier expectations and Committee desires
for some expansion. Following instructions in the
proviso clause of the October 4 directive, the Desk
permitted somewhat less firm market conditions to
develop prior to the November 1 FOMC meeting. At
that meeting the Committee voted to relax slightly
the degree of restraint. Policy was “to maintain money
and credit conditions conducive to the restraint of
inflationary pressures and progress toward reasonable
equilibrium in the country’s balance of payments.” The
operating instructions shifted emphasis from “main-
taining firm hut orderly conditions in the money mar-
ket to “maintaining generally steady conditions in
the money market; provided, however, that operations
shall be modified. -.in the light of hank credit devel-
oplnents duringthe month.”
The next two directives provided more overt moves
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toward less restraint. The broad goals of policy, to
“maintain” and then to “foster money and credit con-
ditions conducive to noninflationary economic expan-
sion,” were to be achieved by “attaining somewhat
easier conditions in the money market, unless bank
credit appears to be resuming a rapid rate of expan-
sion.
On December 27, the Presidents of the Federal
Reserve Banks rescinded the September 1 letter. Its
provisions were no longer deemed applicable because
of changes in economic and financial conditions.
During late 1966 and early 1967, money market
condlitions became easier. Most rates of monetary ex-
pansion showed little change by the end of the year,
but rose significantly in the first few months of 1967.
Net reserve availability increased as member hank
borrowings from the Federal Reserve declined to the
level of early 1966 and fell even lower in early 1967
(Chart 1). Money market rates dropped from their
peaks, but remained at high levels by most past stand-
ards (Chart 2). Rates on certificates of deposit fell
below the ceiling, and commercial banks were again
able to attract these funds (Chart 3). Capital mar-
ket rates declined only slightly in December, hut went
do’svn more significantly in early 1967 (Chart 4).
Only a slight easing response in aggregate monetary
measures was evident by the year’s end (Charts 5, 6,
7, 8). Total reserves and money responded slowly to
the change in policy. Bank credit started to expand,
but at first this reflected almost solely gro\vth in time
deposits. This renewed intermediation of banks was
facilitated by dleclines in mark-ct rates not subject to
26 regulation, enabling banks to compete more effectively
24 for certificates of deposit. To some extent, such growth
in time deposits and hank credit represented a re-
22 channeling of funds through the banking system rather
than a net expansion of funds to borrowers.
20 Rates of monetary expansion showed a significant
acceleration in early 1967. This may represent a shorter
18 lag between the time the Committee states a desire
for change in the rates of expansion of aggregate mon-
16 etary measures and the time when such changes actn-
ally appear in the measures. This implementation lag
was probably shorter in late 1966 than in most previ-
14 ous periods, but still leaves room for improvement.
Methods of Monetary
Management
The foregoing review of monetary developments
during 1966 and early 1967 has pointed out several
significant innovations in policy implementation. The
new techniques may be divided into two categories:
those related to open market operations and those in-
volving complementary actions. This section discusses
the new techniques and sets forth an assessment of
each.
Innovations in Open Market Operations
Economic and Financial Conditions Specified More
Clearly in the Directives
Beginning in mid-1966, the directive became more
specific in identifying the economic and financial con-
ditions the Committee considered in formulating pol-
icy. The wording of the first part of the directive,
which cites these conditions (Exhibit I, Column 1),
was changed substantially at many of the meetings. By
comparison, dlireetives earlier in the year and in pre-
vious years containedi less detailed descriptions of eco-
nomic and financial conditions, These descriptions
were modified more frequently in 1966 than in most
previous years, reflecting in part the rapid pace at
which economic conditions were changing.2
Beginning with the June7 directive, specific mention
was made of such factors as the liquidity of nonhank
financial institutions, conditions in the mortgage mar—
kets, and declining automobile sales. Later directives
tm
For excerpts from the FOMC current economic policy direc-
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Page 16added weakeningin residential construction, increased
strain in the financial markets, and rising business in-
ventories. The September 13 directive cited “the new
fiscal program announced by the President5’ as a factor
influencing monetary policy. The November 1 direc-
tive observed that “certain fiscal policy measures have
recently been enacted by the Congress.” The Com-
mittee also noted that rising defense expenditures were
becoming a larger factor in the continued expansion
of economic activity.
The more complete summaries of economic and
financial conditions inthe directives provide the public
with a concise record of those developments which the
Committee considered most important. From this
standpoint alone they are a valuable contribution.
More importantly, these summaries focus the attention
of the Committee and the Desk on the major issues
concerning the nation’s economic progress, as well as
on the day-to-day problems of influencing money mar-
ket conditions.
Proviso Clause Jntroduced and Developed
The introduction of the proviso clause was a most
significant step forward in monetary management.
This clause focuses on the linkage between money
market conditions and movements in aggregate mon-
etary measures — a linkage that needs to be more fully
understood and more frequently considered in mon-
etary management.
The proviso clause generally stated that open mar-
ket operations between FOMC meetings were to be
based on a prescribed set of money market conditions,
provided that a specified aggregate monetary measure
behaved in a particular way. If the operating guide
did not behave as expected, the Desk was to effect
appropriate changes in money market conditions. Pre-
viously, the Committee had stated its desired objec-
tives for monetary and credit expansion in general
terms but gave its instructions to the Desk only in
terms of money market conditions.3
The clause was introduced on May 10, following a
prolonged period when money and bank credit had
expanded rapidly (contrary to FOMC desires) even
though money market conditions had become progres-
sively tighter (as the Committee had instructed). As
pointed out previously, growing credit demands led
to rapid monetary expansion even though market con-
ditions tightened. Such results highlight the difficulty
a“The Strategy of Open Market Operations,” by Jack Cuttentag
in the February 1966 Quarterly Journal of Economics con-
structively criticizes the use of money market conditions alone
as a guide for monetary policy. It proposes the use of various
guides having different control periods.
of projecting a consistent relationship between money
market conditions and aggregate monetary measures.
In retrospect, policy may have moved to restrain
growth in monetary aggregates attoo slow a pace from
January to April, probably because of the concentra-
tion on money market conditions. The System supplied
reserves to prevent even tighter market conditions from
developing in response to sharply rising credit de-
mands. Such actions led to rapid expansion in reserves
and resulted in larger growth rates of money and bank
credit than were desirable forthe inflationary economic
situation of early last year. These actions prevented
interest rates fromn rising as sharply as economic forces
at the time would otherwise have dictated.
The proviso clause was designed to help achieve de-
sired changes in monetary aggregates at a time of
rapidly changing demands for credit. It supplies a
means for adjusting open market operations more
swiftly to shifts in the linkages between money mar-
ket conditions and aggregate monetary variables which
result from changes in economic activity and expecta-
tions. In the past, the FOMC usually changed its in-
structions to the Desk regarding money market con-
ditions at its periodic meetings— a rather slow process
of trial and error during periods of rapid economic
change. The proviso clause, in contrast, instructs the
Desk Manager to change desired money market con-
ditions between meetings. It directs him to alter the
money market guide if new information indicates that
the intermediate operating guide is not behaving in
the desired manner. The provisions of the clause spec-
ify Committee desires more clearly over a broader
range of measures, permitting changes in the short-run
measures between meetings.
The proviso clause itself went through several
changes during the year. The operating guide cited
in the clause from May through mid-August was re-
quired reserves. In the following months it was bank
credit.
A new measure, the bank credit proxy, was devel-
oped during the year in order to get current informa-
tion about the operating guide more frequently. This
measure infers changes in member bank loans and
investments (assets) from changes in member hank
deposits (liahilities).4 Deposit data are available week-
ly on a daily average basis, whereas bank credit data
are available less frequently.
4The October 1966 Federal Reserve Bulletin presents a monthly
series on total deposits subject to reserves and on pages 1460-




At times during the year the Committee altered the
direction of change in the operating guide of the pro-
viso clause. From May through August the clause was
used to effectfirmer market conditions if the operating
guide expanded more rapidly than desired, By con-
trast, the September 13 and October 4 directives called
for operations to be “modified in the light of ... any
apparently significant deviations of hank credit from
current expectations,” as the Commnittee sought to re-
sist a major change in either direction. Instructions in
the November 1 directive were to he modified “in light
of bank credit developments during the month,” a
double-edged proviso. On November 22, the Com-
mittee decided on a less restrictive policy, “. .-attain-
ing somewhat easier conditions in the mnoney market,
unless bank credit appears to be resumning a rapid rate
of expansion.” During the rest of the year, the clause
was used as a safety valve to insure that the pace of
monetary expansion did not exceed the Committee’s
desire,
Because the proviso clause is still too new to evalu-
ate its actual effectiveness, this discussion deals mostly
with its potential. The clause acknowledges formally
that gradual and infrequent changes in money market
conditions may not always result in desired movements
in the aggregate measures. Therefore, it directs the
Desk Manager to consider the most recent develop-
ments in the specified aggregate mneasure when inter-
preting his instructions concerning desired money
market conditions.
Effective use of the proviso clause might help to
prevent another situation like the one in 1.960-61. At
that time, money market conditions became easier,
following Committee instructions, but the reserve base
and money stock continued to decline for several
months, contrary to FOMC desires. In retrospect, this
happened because the economy was sliding into a re-
cession, which by itself caused easier money market
conditions. By focusing on the pace of market changes
every three or four weeks and by not permitting more
rapid changes in market conditions, System actions
resulted in an undesired contraction of bank reserves
and the money stock.
Use of the clause is an improvement over former
practices because it provides the Desk with a specific
rule for modifying the desired market conditions stated
in the directive. One aggregate monetary measure is
selected as an operating guide; its behavior then deter-
150 mines for the Desk when and how desired market
145 conditions should be changed.
In the past, several aggregate measures were men-
tioned as intermediate objectives, but they often be-
haved differently in the short run. This ambiguity
made it difficult for the FOMC, the Desk, and the
public to decide whether the specific intermediate
goals of policy were being met.
Selecting one intermediate measure as an operating
guide reduces this problem, but intensifies the impor-
tance of selecting the most appropriate one. Presum-
ably, with perfect knowledge of all the interrelation-
ships among financial and real variables, any broad
measure which can be controlled by the monetary
authorities would be as useful as any other. However,
our knowledge of these interrelationships is limited.
Meanwhile, the problem remains of finding the oper-
ating guide whose movements show most clearly the
thrust of monetary actions on the economy. At present,
there is no general agreement among monetary econ-
omists as to which measure best serves this purpose.
The Committee first selected required reserves as
the operating guide and later switched to bank credit,
Other aggregate measures frequently cited by mon-
etary economists, including the money stock and the
reserve base, were not used in the clause. This does
not mean, however, that all other aggregate measures
were ignored in the formulation of policy. Each mem-
ber of the FOMC had a set of measures which he
considered most important for monetary management
and which influenced his evaluation of desired be-
havior for the operating guide actually selected.
An additional effect of the proviso clause is to per-
mit the Committee to give instructions to the Desk that
are applicable for slightly longer periods. The Com-
mnittee is able to focus its attention more directly on
tmThe clause can have more than one provision for modifying
market conditions as long as each provision is clearly defined
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Page 18economic developments and the proper gi-owth in
intermediate measures rather than on day-to-day fluc-
tuations in market factors.
Policy Changed More Continuously
Changes in open market policy were called for on
a more continuous basis in 1966 than in most previous
years. The Committee tended to make more frequent
and more gradual changes in its stated policy even
though there was only one change in basic direction.
In previous years, moves were often made in more dis-
crete jumps.°
In the first half of the year, the Committee called
for gradual moves toward more restraint. By the end
of the year, the Committee directed gradual moves
toward less restraint. Increasing emphasis was placed
on the proviso clause following its introduction in May.
Use of the clause, in itself, may reduce the need for
more discrete policy changes in terms of money market
conditions.
Treasury financing schedules were referred to in
seven of the fifteen directives issued in 1966 (Exhibit I,
Column 3). Movements in market interest rates in-
dicate, however, that the traditional policy of main-
taining an “even keel” during such finaneings may
have been relaxed somewhat. During the February
refunding and prefunding operations, interest rates
rose sharply. Market conditions became firmer in May,
and interest rates moved higher immediately prior to
the Treasury’s refunding. Interest rates increased very
rapidly after completion of theAugust Treasury financ-
ing. A slight increase in yields followed the early
November refunding. In contrast to these experiences,
many interest rates declined around the time of the
Treasury refunding in January 1967.
Changes in market interest rates during thesefinanc-
ings reflected market developments which were only
partially offset by the System rather than policy ac-
tions. Prior to 1966, little variation in rates occurred
during such periods. Treasury finaneings were sched-
uled so frequently that they often presented a major
obstacle to implementing policy changes. Even ~vith
moderate rate variations during its financings in 1966,
the Treasury was able to obtain the funds it needed
and the market suffered no great adverse effects.
Operating Instruments More Varied
In response to a variety of special challenges during
the year, adjustments were made in the types of trans-
actions included in open market operations.
6For example, the June 1965 icsue of this Review identifies
more distinct policy periods in 1964.
Ratio Scole
Chest 7
Money Stock Plus Time Deposits
The simplest type of open market transaction is the
outright purchase or sale of Government securities by
the System. Another type of transaction is the repur-
chase agreement. In this ease, the System buys Gov-
ernment securities from a dealer, agreeing to sell the
same issues back at a specified price and \vithin a spec-
ified time, not longer than fifteen days. In effect, the
System supplies reserves to the banking system on a
temporary basis. Since the dealers have the option of
buying the securities back from the System before the
agreement matures, the additional reserves are often
withdrawn if other factors lead to increased reserve
availability in the banking sector.
The Committee’s continuing authority directive,
which sets regulations for open market transactions,
formerly restricted repurchase agreements under most
circumstances to Government securities maturingwith-
in two years. On June 28, the Committee voted to
remove this restriction, giving the Desk authority to
make repurchase agreements on other Tieasury issues.
This proved helpful at times when there was a scarcity
of Treasury bills and other short-term Government
securities in the market, such as in the late summer
of last year
The matched sale-purchase transaction was first used
in July 1966. In this type of transaction, the System
receives payment from the dealers for securities it sells
temporarily, thereby absorbing reserves from the bank-
ing system. This technique was first used to offset
large temporary increases in float (and in reserves)
caused by the airline strike in July. Large outright
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Page 19sales of securities by the System at that time might
have been misinterpreted as a move toward an even
more stringent policy, and might have had undesired
effects on market expectations.
Development of matched sale-purchase transactions
along with the use of repurchase agreements facili-
tated the smoothing of market pressures. The Desk
was able to provide or absorb reserves in substantial
volumes for short periods more quickly and easily than
formerly and with less effect on market expectations.
There was some concern in the third quarter of 1966
that even temporary fluctuations in market pressure
would have significant—and undesirable—effects on
market conditions and expectations. High interest rates
and financing costs had led to a sharp curtaihnent of
dealer inventories, making the market more sensitive
to slight changes in the supply of or demand for secur-
ities. Repurchase agreements and matched sale-pur-
chase transactions provided considerable flexibility for
Exhibit II
open market operations under these circumstances.
On November 1, the Committee revised the con-
tinuing authority directive to enable the Desk to make
repurchase agreements on securities that were direct
obligations of or fully guaranteed by U. S. Govern-
ment agencies. This action followed Congressional
legislation making such securities eligible for purchase
by the System. A few repurchase agreements in-
volving agency securities were made after the author-
ization was given, but they represented only a small
portion of total System repurchase agreements.
Actions Complementing Open Market
Operations
Frequently during the year, the Federal Reserve
used methods other than open market operations to
implement monetary policy. Selective changes in Sys-
tem regulations, reserve requirements, and administra-
tion of the discount facilities were adopted in 1966.
FEDERAL RESERVE ACTIONS COMPLEMENTING OPEN MARKET OPERATIONS IN 1 966
Date Description of Action
Additional Information
in the Federal Reserve
Bulletin for:
Differential reserve requirements established on time deposits. Re-
quirements roised from 4 per cent to 5 per cent on each member
bank’s holdings of time deposits (other than savings deposits) in
excess of $5 million.
Maximum rate member banks permitted to poy on time deposits hoving
multiple moturities lowered from 51/, per cent to S per cent on those
of 90 doys or more and to 4 per cent on those of lesn than 90 days.
Boord of Governors requested brooder authority from Congress for
itself, the Federal Deposit Insurance dorporotios, ond the Federol
Home loon Bonk Board in netting rote limitations for banks and
savings and loon associations.
Differential reserve requirements widened on time deposits. Require-
ments raised from 5 per cent to 6 per cent on eoch member bank’s
holdings of time deposits (other than savings deposits) in excess of
$5 million.
Presidents of the Federal Reserve Banks sent o letter to each member
bank requesting moderation of business loon expansion and disposi-
tion of municipal securities. The letter also stoted, ‘‘It is recognized
that banks odjusting their positions through loon curtoilment may ot
times need o longer period of discount occommodotion thon would be




Maximum rate member bonks permitted to pay on any time deposit
under $100,000 reduced from 55/, per cent to 5 per cent. Similor octions
for institutions under their jurisdiction token by Federot Deposit In—
suronce Corporation and Federal Home loon Bonk Board, tncreosed
authority for establishing ceiling rates on time deposits and on sovings
accounts hod been gronted by Congress (see July 15 request for such
legislation).
September 1 letter rescinded because ‘‘credit conditions hove changed,
the expansion of business loons has been reduced to o more moderate
rote, ond bonks no longer ore unlooding securities in unreceptive
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(Effective Sept. 8 for
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Page 20Time Deposit Growth Restricted by Interest Rate
Ceiling
The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System, through its Regulation Q, sets the maximum
rates which member banks are allowed to pay on time
and savings deposits. In previous years, the System
had never used this power to affect very greatly the
growth of time and savings deposits. Each time that
rates reached the maximum, the maximum was raised.
As noted earlier, the Board raised the maximum rate
allowed on time deposits other than savings from 4h
per cent to 5% per cent in December 1965. In suc-
ceeding months, offering rates on time deposits rose
rapidly. By summer, they reached the ceiling rate,
and the regulation restricted time deposit growth.
Thereafter, the only change in Regulation Q was to
lower the rate limit on certain types of time deposits
(Exhibit II)
The Federal Reserve maintained the 5% per cent
ceiling rate on time deposits even though yields on
competitive market instruments and secondary market
rates on certificates of deposit (CD’s) rose substan-
tially above this rate by the end of the summer. Com-
mercial banks experienced a sharp net loss of large
CD’s after August. Total time deposits declined slightly
from September to November. This loss of deposits
can be attributed largely to the bite of Regulation Q.
The effects of the regulation thus contributed to the
slower growth of bank credit in the fall of 1966.
The economic impact of this action is less clear;
presumably most savings continued to flow to investors
through avenues other than commercial banks. As
market rates rose above the maximum rates that com-
mercial banks and other regulated intermediaries were
allowed to pay on deposits, funds tended to flow di-
rectly into the financial markets rather than going
through these intermediaries.
Differential Reserve Requirements Established on
Time Deposits
In July 1966, for the first time, reserve requirements
were established for one type of time deposits that
were different than those for other types (Exhibit II).
There is no clear-cut way to estimate the effect of
these differential reserve requirements on economic
stabilization, Highercosts may have made large banks
somewhat less eager to seek time deposits. Also, these
higher requirements absorbed some reserves, reducing
the amount available to support demand deposits and
bank credit unless offset by open market operations.
Possibly the major significance of these acts was that




concern about the financial conditions then develop-
ing, particularly with regard to mortgage markets.
The selective aspect of these changes, which excluded
the first $5 million of time deposits at each bank from
the higher requirements, illustrated the Board’s desire
to moderate deposit expansion at the large banks with-
out affecting smaller banks.
Discount Rate Maintained Below Market Rates
The absence of a change in the discount rate in the
fall of 1966 was a marked departure from practices
over the past few decades. It placed a greater burden
on administration of the Reserve Banks’ discount win-
dows. Throughout 1966, the discount rate remained at
the 4% per cent level established in December 1965.
This rate was clearly out of contact with market rates
during most of the year (Chart 2).~When this hap-
pened in the past, the discount rate was usually
brought into line with market rates.
The Federal funds rate was almost continuously
above the discount rate, with the margin increasing
through late summer. From the viewpoint of an indi-
vidual hank, buying Federal funds is a close substitute
for borrowing from the Reserve Banks. Such trans-
actions represent one member bank’s making an over-
night loan to another member bank.
Formerly, the market-determined rate on such trans-
actions was near the administered discount rate, usu-
~The directors of seven Reserve Banks did apply to the Board
of Governors for permission to raise their discount rates, but
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Page 21ally below it. Banks would meet reserve deficiencies
by borrowing Federal funds from other banks only if
they could do so at or below the rate they would have
to pay if they borrowed from their Reserve Bank. Dur-
ing 1965, the rate on Federal funds was frequently
about X of a percentage point above the discount rate,
The rate on Federal funds rose sharply during 1966,
while the discount rate remained unchanged. The
Federal funds rate averaged 6 per cent during one
week in early November, 1% percentage points above
the discount rate, The spreads between the Federal
funds rate and the discount rate recorded in 1966 in-
dicate that member banks were reluctant to borrow
too frequently from the Federal Reserve Bank, re-
flecting the rules of administration of this facility.
The September 1 letter sent by the Presidents of the
Reserve Banks to each member hank in their district
suggested closer administration of Federal Reserve
lending and moral suasion. The letter mentioned the
availability of the discount windo\v to member banks
which cooperated in moderating their expansion of
business loans and their disposition of some other
assets.
This letter, which was in effect until late December,
created mnch uncertainty in the banking system and
in the financial markets, It represented a seldom used
approach to administering the discount windo\v. Sug-
gestions by the lender of last resort are taken very
seriously (sometimes even more seriously than in-
tended) when the market is anticipating fui-ther re-
duction in the availability of funds. The volume of
hank borrowing from the Federal Reserve Banks did
not increase significantly, even though market rates
were high relative to the discount rate, This suggests
that some member banks mistakenly interpreted the
letter as a threat to their use of the discount window,
Business loans, which had increased at an 18 per
cent annual rate from mid-1965 to Angust 1966, grew
at only a6per cent rate from August to December,
This change of trend was probably due largely to the
rapid decline of CI) money during the period, There
is thus some question as to how much of the modera-
tion of growth in business loans was attributable to
the September 1 letter. Business loans at large banks,
for example, had declined for several weeks before the
first letter was issued.
The 1966 experience demonstrated that the discount
rate can be maintained at a rate substantially below
market rates. Such conditions, however, require more
discretionary administration of the discount window
and provide subsidies to banks that do borrow, Limit-
ing the desire to borrow through discount rate adjust-
ments seems preferable from most points of view.
Summary and Conclusions
With the perspective of a few months, it appears
that stated monetary policy during 1966 was generally
appropriate undervery challenging and rapidly chang-
ing economic conditions. At times during the year, the
process of attaining policy objectives in tersns of the
aggregate monetary measures remained slow. From
January to April, monetary expansion was excessive
despite the stated policy of restraint. From May to
October, aggregate measures generally moved more
consistently with Committee desires. Toward the end
of this period, the Committee apparently would have
preferred some moderate expansion in these measures.
In November and December, monetary expansion may
have been weaker than desired. Monetary expansion
did accelerate in early 1967, so the lag svas moderate
relative to most past experience. Progress was thus
made in shortening the lag between policy decisions
and changes in the aggregate measures.
During 1966, both new and seldom used techniques
of monetary management were added to the more
standard procedures to help achieve policy objectives.
For example, innovations in the use of actions com-
plementing open market operations allowed the Sys-
tem to exercise considerable restraint while maintain-
ing orderly mag-ket conditions. Treasury financings
apparently do not present as great an obstacle to pol-
icy changes as thought in many previous years. The
moderate interest rate changes which occurred during
the financings in 1966 had no great adverse effect on
the market or on the Treasury’s ability to secure funds.
A wider variety of transactions available for open
market operations also provided the System with
greater operating flexibility.
To many economists, however, the most important
new technique for monetary management was the
proviso clause, After its adoption in May, the rates
of monetary expansion appeared more in line with the
Committee’s desires than they had earlier in the year.
But even \vith the proviso clause, there was a sig-
nificant lag between the change in policy in Tate 1966
and the desired change in monetary expansion. FOMC
direeti\es at that time called for resumption of mon-
etary growth. Money market conditions eased, hut
money and hank credit gre\v little from November to
the end of the year.
Some time lag may he required for aggregate meas-
ures to respond to Systesn actions. The wording of
the clause in late 1966, however, may have added to
Page 22the lag at that time. It called for a change in desired
money market conditions only if monetary expansion
proceeded too rapidly. In retrospect, the lag mnight
have been shorter if the provision had been for greater
easing of market conditions if bank credit expansion
was not rapid enough.
The use of the proviso clause emphasizes the need
for selecting the most useful operating guide for
policy. It also emphasizes the need to understand
more fully the relationships between money market
conditions and the operating guide and among those
aggregate monetary measures which might be used as
operating guides. System research efforts in 1966 con-
tinued to be directed toward studying these linkages.
Questions might be raised about the use of hank
credit as the intermediate guide, especially in view
of the fluctuations in the rates of change in commercial
bank intermediation. These fluctuations occurred chief-
ly because of changes in market rates relative to the
Regulation Q ceiling and probably had little effect on
the total volume of credit available to borrowers. De-
leting the reserve base and money supply as specified
intermediate objectives may have been undesirable.
There is considerable evidence that changes in these
measures show snore clearly the thrust of monetary
actions on the economy.
The proviso clause places the Federal Reserve
System, through its official policy actions, on record
as recognizing that measures of money market con-
ditions taken alone are not a sufficient guide even for
short-run monetary management. B ank reserves,
money, and hank credit have been the chief measures
of monetary actions over periods of several months.
Now their importance in analyzing week-to-week de-
velopments is becoming more apparent.
ELAINE R. GOLDSTEIN
LEO~ALL C. ANDERSEN
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